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Study ten to fourteen days to voyage times and, according to an industry analy- sis, raises costs by between $1 mil- lion and $2.5 million per tanker per voyage (AGBI, 2026). This develop- ment confirms that, in a globalized economy, the continuity of trade de- pends as much on the availability of insurance and financing capacity as on freedom of navigation along major sea lanes. Marine insurance has therefore become a critical chan- nel through which geopolitical risk is transmitted to financial markets and international trade, far beyond its tra- ditional function of providing risk coverage. 5. OVERLAND BYPASS STRATEGIES Faced with uncertainty surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf's lead- ing producers activated bypass infra- structure to preserve the continuity of their exports. Saudi Arabia's East- West Pipeline (Petroline) connects the Abqaiq oil fields to the Yanbu ter- minal on the Red Sea. Its theoretical capacity is approximately 7 million barrels per day, although export ca- pacity at the port of Yanbu limits ac- tual throughput to around 4.5 million barrels per day (Transitions & Éner- gies, 2026). Developed during the 1980s amid regional conflict, the pipeline has for decades been a cen- tral element of Saudi Arabia's strat- egy to diversify its export routes. The United Arab Emirates has more limited bypass capacity, but it is ex- panding rapidly. Before the crisis, the Habshan-Fujairah pipeline could transport approximately 1.8 million barrels per day to the UAE's eastern coast, thereby avoiding the strait (Connaissance des Energies, 2026b). As tensions persisted, Emirati author- ities accelerated an expansion proj- ect intended to raise that capacity to approximately 3.6 million barrels per day by 2027 (Coin Edition, 2026). Taken together, Saudi and Emirati in- frastructure provides bypass capacity of between 8 million and 10 million barrels per day. This remains less than half the volume that normally transits the Strait of Hormuz (Coin Edition, 2026). These pipelines there- fore enhance logistical resilience but do not provide a complete substitute. They reduce the risk of a total inter- ruption of exports without displacing the strait's central role in global en- ergy trade. The 2026 crisis thus con- firms that, in the short term, no overland infrastructure can fully re- place a maritime corridor carrying such a large share of international energy flows. Beyond their technical limitations, these infrastructure arrangements also reveal an institutional constraint. Bypass capacity is governed at the national level, without a regional co- ordination mechanism or common governance framework (Les Clés du Moyen-Orient, n.d.). The absence of such coordination may limit collec- tive response capacity during major disruptions and reduce the potential benefits of a regional approach to se- curing export flows. These constraints also have implica- tions for trade finance. As long as al- ternative routes remain incomplete, economic operators continue to face high volatility in transport and insur- ance costs. Banks financing trade must therefore incorporate this un- certainty into their risk assessments, collateral requirements, and financ- ing terms. The resilience of physical infrastructure is thus inseparable from that of financial infrastructure; both have become complementary components of economic security. 6. A SHIFT IN OPEC DYNAMICS: THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES' WITHDRAWAL On April 28, 2026, the United Arab Emirates announced its withdrawal from the Organization of the Petro- leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the broader OPEC+ alliance, ef- fective May 1. The decision ended fifty-nine years of membership in the organization, dating back to Abu Dhabi's accession in 1967 (IRIS, 2026b; Telos, 2026). Emirati author- ities cited their objective of regaining full autonomy in defining the coun- try's long-term energy strategy (IRIS, 2026b). Beyond its symbolic signifi- cance, the move marked an impor- tant shift in international oil governance and placed greater em- phasis on national policy flexibility. The decision also reflected long- standing differences in production strategy between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. Since 2022, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company has made substantial investments to raise pro- duction capacity from 4.2 million to nearly 4.85 million barrels per day by mid-2025, while production lev- els had at times exceeded the quotas allocated within OPEC+ (Telos, 2026). When the organization agreed in June 2024 to a limited in- crease in those quotas, the adjust- ment remained below the production capacity already in place (Telos, 2026). The UAE is now target- ing capacity of approximately 5 mil- lion barrels per day by 2027, compared with close to 3.2 million before its withdrawal (IRIS, 2026b; Telos, 2026). The timing of the announcement is particularly significant. It came while traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remained significantly disrupted and regional tensions were placing addi- tional pressure on OPEC+ coordina- tion (Telos, 2026). Several analyses characterize the withdrawal as a sig- nificant strategic decision. Additional production capacity cannot be fully utilized commercially while logisti- cal constraints and export bottle- necks limit the volumes that can actually reach market (IRIS, 2026b; Telos, 2026). In other words, greater autonomy over production does not, by itself, guarantee an immediate in- crease in exports. Beyond the Emirati case, the deci- sion raises a broader question about the future governance of oil markets. Created in 1960 to strengthen the collective position of producing countries, OPEC now operates in an environment of increasingly varied the BANKING EXECUTIVE 60 ISSUE 213 SEPTEMBER 2026