BE - September 2026

Study 2. ANATOMY OF A GLOBAL CHOKEPOINT The Strait of Hormuz connects the Gulf to the Indian Ocean through a channel whose width varies from roughly 33 to 55 kilometers, depend- ing on the section. Despite its nar- rowness, it is one of the most strategically important passages in global maritime trade. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identifies it as one of the world's principal mar- itime chokepoints, alongside the Suez and Panama canals, Bab el- Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca (UNCTAD, 2024). Between 2023 and 2025, it carried, on average, ap- proximately one-third of global oil trade, 20% of liquefied natural gas, 30% of liquefied petroleum gas, and a significant share of nitrogen fertil- izer exports (IRIS, 2026a). This ex- ceptional concentration of energy flows gives the strait an importance far out of proportion to its physical size: any disruption to navigation is immediately reflected in energy mar- kets, shipping costs, and the expec- tations of financial market participants. Dependence on the strait, however, varies considerably among the sur- rounding states. Nearly all Kuwaiti and Qatari exports pass through Hor- muz, while Iraq and Iran are exposed to the route for roughly 95% of their exports. Saudi Arabia also remains heavily dependent on the strait de- spite having overland bypass capac- ity. The United Arab Emirates, by contrast, has greater room for ma- neuver because of its access to the Indian Ocean and the development of infrastructure linking its oil fields to the port of Fujairah. This uneven exposure helps explain the different strategies observed during the crisis: some states sought to secure exports through alternative routes, while oth- ers remained dependent on the con- tinued freedom of maritime navigation. The destination of these flows is a second critical factor. Nearly 44% of the oil passing through Hormuz is bound for Asian economies, com- pared with only about 4% for Euro- pean markets (Connaissance des Énergies, 2026a). This trade pattern explains why China, India, Japan, and South Korea are among the economies most exposed to a pro- longed disruption of traffic. The ef- fects of a blockade therefore extend far beyond higher oil prices: they quickly spread to industrial supply chains, maritime freight costs, insur- ance markets, and trade finance. The geography of the strait is thus the first link in a chain of risk transmission connecting physical infrastructure to financial infrastructure. 3. FROM CLOSURE TO A GLOBAL MACROECONOMIC SHOCK The scale of the supply shock caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz clearly distinguishes this crisis from previous episodes of oil-market ten- sion. According to an analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the disruption observed in 2026 was es- timated to be three to five times larger than those associated with major historical shocks. By compari- son, the 1973 oil shock reduced global oil supply by approximately 6%, while the 1979 oil shock associ- ated with developments in Iran caused a decline of about 4% (Fed- eral Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2026). The World Bank, for its part, esti- mates that the closure of the strait re- duced global supply by 10.1 million barrels per day in March 2026 alone - the largest monthly decline on record (World Bank, 2026). In response to the shortage, major in- ternational institutions moved quickly to deploy stabilization meas- ures. The International Energy Agency coordinated an exceptional release of 400 million barrels from reserves, while emphasizing that strategic stocks could not sustainably offset a prolonged interruption of maritime traffic (IEA, 2026). At the same time, U.S. strategic reserves fell to their lowest level since 1983 (EIA, 2026). Higher oil prices also trig- gered demand destruction, with global consumption declining by ap- proximately 0.8 million barrels per day as early as March (World Bank, 2026). The combination of a severe supply shock, large-scale draw- downs of strategic stocks, and rapid demand adjustment underscores the exceptional nature of the crisis. The shock quickly spread beyond energy markets to the broader global economy. The International Mone- tary Fund emphasizes that the effects are highly asymmetric: energy-im- porting countries are more exposed than exporters, low-income economies are more vulnerable than advanced economies, and states with limited fiscal space face greater difficulty absorbing higher energy costs (IMF, 2026). The IMF also notes that Gulf countries occupy a domi- nant position in the global supply of helium, a resource essential to semi- conductor manufacturing, medical equipment, and several high-tech- nology industries. Disruption in Hor- muz therefore extends beyond the oil market and affects value chains that are strategically important to the global economy. The transmission of the shock did not stop at commodity markets. Greater energy-price volatility, rising logistics costs, and uncertainty over the con- tinuity of trade also increased the risks borne by banks financing inter- national commerce. Institutions spe- cializing in trade finance had to reassess transaction risk, while insur- ers and correspondent banks ad- justed their terms of engagement in response to heightened geopolitical risk. The energy shock thus progres- sively developed into a financial shock, setting the stage for the cen- tral role marine insurance would subsequently play in constraining in- ternational trade. 4. MARINE INSURANCE AS A CHANNEL OF GEOECONOMIC RISK The contraction in maritime traffic was not caused solely by the physi- the BANKING EXECUTIVE 56 ISSUE 213 SEPTEMBER 2026